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This response has taken place in the context of two decades of continental movement
toward economic coordination, creation of free trade zones and increased intra-African
trade, increased receptivity to foreign investment, and the return of a number of states
to democratic governance, including South Africa, Namibia and Nigeria. It has oc-
curred in the context of coordination with UN agencies, new patterns of claims under
international law about customary law, humanitarian intervention, pro-democratic
intervention, regional and subregional assistance in upholding the freedom of African
peoples to determine and protect their choices about governance, and generally much
inquiry about the mostjust and effective strategies for crisis intervention within African
states.
The larger international community has noticed. Some states and commentators have
continued to try to give Africa lessons in how to govern itself, a trend stretching back
some five centuries through European colonialism into the slave trade and slavery. They
have denied that Africans could make any positive contributions here at all. But other
states and organizations have drawn lessons and examples of new legal doctrine and
interpretations, subregional coordination, institution-building, and governance, and have
begun adapting them to crises in other regions where new thinking about peace build-
ing is needed. Thus we now seem to be in a second phase of African contributions to
international law within the last half century. The first phase was produced by the pro-
cess of decolonization from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, and the interpretations
of international law that it produced. Then African interpretations were contentious
because they tended to challenge the continued use of international law to support
European dominance. They were contentious, further, because historically peoples of
African heritage have generally not been perceived as either capable or authorized to
invoke or prescribe international law. Time will tell whether the second-phase African
contributions will prove as contentious.
Our panel this afternoon features a group of experienced and notable scholars. We
convene to explore the African contributions to the international law of peacekeeping
that are emerging.
THE EVOLVING INTERVENTION REGIME IN AFRICA:
FROM BASKET CASE TO MARKET PLACE?
by Jeremy Levitt
INTRODUCTION
Our topic, "Peacemaking Practices from the South: African Contributions to the Law
of Peackeeping," is both unique and dynamic. The title was chosen to qualify and quan-
tify in legal terms in a public forum the evolving intervention regime in Africa. In
authoring this evolving intervention regime, African states have proffered the most
legally and politically coherent peacemaking frameworks in the world, frameworks that
clearly elucidate when groups of states and regional organizations may use force in
states for humanitarian purposes.
Historically among the most conservative subscribers to the international law prin-
ciples of state sovereignty, nonintervention, and territorial integrity, today, only twelve
years into the post-Cold War era, African states and regional organizations have adopted,
established, and put into action norm-creating mechanisms that are chiseling away at
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
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traditional prohibitions against uses of force outside the authority of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC).
The analysis that follows aims to present dynamic new information about pressing law
of the use of force and peacemaking developments in Africa. It is meant to be more
descriptive than analytic. It will discuss, among other things, the evolution of the inter-
national law of the use of force by assessing state practice and treaty law developments
in Africa since the end of the Cold War-developments that undoubtedly form an
important part of the evolution of the corpus of general international law.
Space constraints will not permit me to examine the legality of the various African
interventions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War (the majority of which
took place without UNSC authorization). These include the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau,
and now Guinea; the Mission for the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB)
in the Central African Republic (CAR); and the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC) operation in Lesotho. I will nonetheless discuss the efficacy of the regional
frameworks that gave them impetus.1 I will also refer to the intervention provisions in the
new Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), which in late 2002 will replace the
Organization of African Unity as the premier continental organization in Africa.
Not only is Africa the first region to advance comprehensive intervention regimes, but
the ones it advances are leagues ahead of the other regions of the world. African state
practice and treaty law developments since the end of the Cold War illustrate that, with
some exceptions, African nations have been among the most committed to creating
peace both within and outside of Africa.
BIASES IN THE LAW OF THE USE OF FORCE
In international studies Africa is viewed as a pariah-a basket case, not a market
place. In law schools most academic consider African states to be objects rather than
subjects of international law. This explains why a significant portion of the wide-body
of literature on the law of use of force, and more generally peacekeeping and humani-
tarian intervention, is heavily biased and flawed. The geopolitical, Eurocentric, and
linear bias in Western legal academia is astounding when it is applied to Africa. This is
in part due to a lack of Western intellectual interest in the continent; however, inter-
national lawyers also typically lack multidisciplinary training and regional expertise,
particularly on the developing world.
As a result, topical discussions on, for example, peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
humanitarian intervention, and other peacemaking developments in Africa are either
uninformed or inadequately analyzed. More often than not, when analysts assess Afri-
can security issues, they do so with a voice reminiscent of agents of the British Colonial
Office in the eighteenth centuryl8th century, paternalistic and unaware. This phenom-
enon is unfortunate. It creates an environment enabling production of analytically weak
scholarship on Africa. The academy can do better. It is time to pay closer attention to
international law influences from the world's second largest continent, the one with the
highest density of states: Africa.
' For an analysis of the legality of these interventions see, JeremyLevitt, African Interventionist States and
InternationalLaw, in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.) AFRiCAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES (Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing, 2001). Since the MISAB intervention took place under the auspices of an ad hoc group of states
rather than a regional organization, it will be referred to only casually in the analysis that follows.
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THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
In 1975, the ECOWAS was founded by treaty.2 Its main aim at the time was to spur
economic integration and development in West Africa; regional security was an impor-
tant but not vital concern. It later adopted the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression, and the
1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance and Defense.3 Neither the treaty nor the
protocols empowered ECOWAS to launch peacekeeping missions (although the 1981
Protocol did empower it to intervene in conflicts that were "externally engineered").
Liberia
In 1989, ECOWAS was tested with the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997). International
disinterest and inaction by the United Nations and United States forced ECOWAS to
intervene in Liberai to halt the war and protect human life.
In November 1992, two full years after ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, the UNSC
adopted Resolution 788, which placed an arms and petroleum embargo against Liberia
and empowered ECOWAS to enforce its terms. The following year, in September 1993, it
adopted Resolution 866, which established the UN Observer Group in Liberia (UNOMIL),
where, for the first time in UN history, the UN codeployed forces with another mission
(the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)) already underway. Needless
to say, the ECOMOG continued to serve as primary keeper of the peace.
Moreover, betweenJanuary 1991 and November 1996, the UNSC adopted fifteen reso-
lutions and the president of the UNSC issued nine presidential statements, all relating
to the situation in Liberia. Almost every resolution and statement commended ECOWAS
for its efforts; asked UN member states to support it financially; encouraged African
states to contribute troops to it; and condemned attacks against it by rebel factions. Not
once was ECOWAS condemned for inappropriate conduct.
UNSC action thus placed a retroactive de jure seal of approval on ECOWAS inter-
vention; I consider this concrete evidence that a broad right of humanitarian interven-
tion exists. At the least, UNSC action in this case confirmed that an intervention taken
outside of the authority of the UN Charter could indeed be legal.
Article 58 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty
In July 1993, three years into its "peace creation" mission in Liberia ECOWAS
adopted its Revised Treaty of 1993 (Treaty),' in part to provide a basis for future peace-
keeping. Article 4(e) of the Treaty states that the contracting parties of the ECOWAS
affirm their adherence to the "maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security
through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness." Article 58 dealing
with regional security maintains that peace and security is a key objective of ECOWAS
and in pursuit of this objective empowers the organization to "establish a regional peace
and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate." Section
3 of Article 58 also provides for the adoption of protocols on political cooperation and
regional peace and stability.
2 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 28, 1975 ) (on file with
author).
' ECOWAS Protocal on Non-Aggression, April 22, 1978, reprinted in 6 REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISES 18-19 (M. Weller ed., 1994) [hereinafter REGIONAL
PEACE-KEEPING]; ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, May 29, 1981, reprinted in
REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING, at 19-24.
a Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty, Article 58 Regional Security,July 24, 1993
(on file with author).
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Sierra Leone
In an attempt to avert the toppling of the democratically elected government of
Sierra Leone by both military and insurgent elements and to forestall intense civil
conflict, the head of state of Nigeria and the authority of the heads of state and gov-
ernment of ECOWAS (AHSGECO) relied on Article 58 tojustify their interventions in
Sierra Leone in May and August of 1997, although there were other legal bases for
these interventions.5 In October 1997, the UNSC supported the ECOWAS intervention
in Sierra Leone by adopting Resolution 1132, which imposed an arms and petroleum
embargo and travel restrictions against the junta. It also empowered ECOWAS to
enforce its terms.
The ECOWAS Framework
In October 1998, some fourteen months after the interventions in Liberia and Sierra
Leone and in an effort to consolidate its capacity for preventing, managing, and re-
solving conflict, the AHSGECO adopted a binding mechanism to allow for interstate
collaboration in the collective management of regional security: the Framework for the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Secu-
rity6 (Framework). The Framework sets out an elaborate scheme for ECOWAS-ECOMOG
enforcement operations, including a coherent command and control structure. It calls
for the creation of an ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to, among other
things, authorize all forms of intervention, including military. It also draws an inter-
esting distinction between interstate and intrastate conflict.
In internal conflict situations that are sustained and maintained from within, Para-
graph 46 of the Framework provides for military intervention by ECOWAS when situ-
ations: (1) threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster; (2) pose a serious threat to peace
and security in the subregion; and (3) follow the overthrow or attempted overthrow of
a democratically elected government. Except for the SADC and the new AU, no other
regional organization has laid down a normative framework for unilateral military
intervention in interstate or intrastate conflict. Furthermore, Paragraph 52 of the Frame-
work provides, among other things, that the ECOMOG may undertake military opera-
tions for peacekeeping; humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian actions;
and the enforcement of sanctions and embargos. ECOWAS is thus the first regional
arrangement to codify both humanitarian and pro-democratic rights of intervention.
Guinea-Bissau
Ironically, the Framework, which had been in ECOWAS bureaucratic pipeline for
quite some time, was adoptedjust over a month before ECOWAS dispatched ECOMOG
to Guinea-Bissau in December 1998. ECOMOG replaced Senegalese and Guinean
troops who had intervened inJune 1998 to save the sitting government from a mutiny
by high-ranking officers of its armed forces and to avert mass civil conflict between
loyalist and opposition forces. It deployed ECOMOG for the following reasons: (1) to
monitor the peace and imposition of a Government of National Unity; (2) to guarantee
security along the Senegalese/Guinean border; (3) to keep the warring parties apart;
' SeeJeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by RegionalActors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363 (1998).6Framework Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution,
Peace-keeping, and Security, meeting of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, Banjul,July
23-24,1998, adopted, Heads of State meeting, Abuja, October 30-31,1998, inAFRicAN LEGALMATERIALsAFR.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 148 (Mar. 1999).
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and (4) to guarantee free access to humanitarian entities. What is interesting here is
that on December 26, 1998, less than one week before ECOMOG deployed in Guinea-
Bissau, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1216, which approved of the ECOMOG mission
and recognized that it might need to employ force to effectuate its mandate.
The ECOWAS Protocol
In December 1999, approximately one year after the Framework was adopted and the
ECOWAS authorized the Guinea-Bissau operation, it adopted the Protocol Establishing
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, PeaceKeeping and
Security7 (Protocol), which aims to further implement Article 58 of the Revised Treaty.
A key objective of the Protocol is to prevent, manage, and resolve internal and inter-
state conflict-and here it states that Paragraph 46 of the Framework is controlling on
these matters. Like the Framework, Article 22 of the Protocol states that peacekeeping
and the restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian
disaster; and enforcement of sanctions including embargoes are key responsibilities of
ECOMOG. Article 22 does not recognize the authority of the UNSC in either adjudi-
cating nor maintaining international peace and security matters. Perhaps this is a
positive development, given the UN's dismal record in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, the
Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone-just to mention a
few UN operations.
Article 25 of the Protocol complements Paragraph 46 of the Framework, stating that
the mechanism may take enforcement action in internal conflicts in situations: (1)
where there is a threat of a humanitarian disaster or a serious threat to peace and secu-
rity in the subregion; (2) where there has been a serious and massive violation of human
rights and the rule of law; and (3) where there has been an overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a democratically elected government. For these very reasons ECOWAS
sought to establish an ECOMOG force along the borders of Guinea and Liberia in
December 2000, to prevent border skirmishes between the two countries from esca-
lating into full-blown conflict.
This is the background for the development of ECOWAS law, which has evolved
progressively over the past twelve years to meet the growing security challenges in West
Africa. ECOWAS law not only lays down an unambiguous framework for the protection
of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, it also codifies both humanitarian and
pro-democratic rights of intervention. The revolutionary evolution of ECOWAS law
comes at the behest of West African nations, who have time after time demonstrated
their willingness to forfeit sovereignty for peace and security.
Notwithstanding the ECOWAS is not wholly unique in this respect. The SADC has
proffered similar regional security structures.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
The SADC Treaty and Organ
In January 1992 the Council of Ministers of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC), decided to convert SADCC, which had been
founded by the then-front line states and was preoccupied with reducing regional
dependence on apartheid South Africa, into SADC-the Southern African Develop-
ment Community. This move appears to have been in part inspired by the changing
'Protocol Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution,
and Peace-keeping, and Security, UN Doc. A/DEC.12/10/99, Lome, Togo, Dec. 10, 1999 (on file with
author).
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political environment in South Africa in the wake of Nelson Mandela's release from
prison in 1990 and the ongoing efforts to fully dismantle the country's apartheid sys-
tem. In October 1993 the new SADC Treaty entered into force.8 One of its primary
objectives is to "promote and defend peace and security" in the Southern African region.9
InJune 1996 the Authority of the Heads of State and Government of SADC (AHSG)
adopted the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (Organ)." Key aims of the
Organ are to protect the people and development of the region against the breakdown
of law and order and against interstate and intrastate conflict. The Organ supports
cooperation in regional security through conflict management and by coordinating the
participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping.
Objective (g) of the Organ states that where diplomatic efforts fail the Organ is re-
sponsible for recommending punitive measures to the Summit of the Heads of State of
SADC. It also states that measures to be taken in this regard would be further elab-
orated in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution.
The SADC Protocol
In 1997, the SADC Summit adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security
in the SADC Region." Under the SADC Protocol, protection people from instability
arising from the breakdown of law and order; engaging in conflict prevention, manage-
ment, and resolution; and promoting peacemaking and peacekeeping to achieve
sustainable peace and security are all core functions. Furthermore, like Paragraph 46
of the ECOWAS Framework, Article 5(2) of the Protocol sets out an elaborate criteria
for when regional intervention in internal conflicts is justified: when there is (1) large-
scale conflict violence between sections of the population of a state, or between the
state or its armed or paramilitary forces and sections of the population; (2) a threat to
the legitimate authority of the government (such as a military coup by armed or para-
military forces); (3) a condition of civil war or insurgency; (4) or any crisis that could
threaten the peace and security of other member states. The SADC Protocol states that
in cases of internal conflict the Organ "shall respond to an invitation by a member
country to become involved in mediating a conflict within its borders."
Hence, one key distinction between the law of ECOWAS and SADC is that the latter
appears to be more conservative; it seems to require that a country consent to an inter-
vention, while ECOWAS law clearly does not. Moreover, Article 2 (g) seems to recognize
an ambiguous role for the OAU and the United Nations in "endorsing" SADC opera-
tions that entail the use of force. The ECOWAS Framework and Protocol do not make
such an acknowledgment. Yet the SADC did not seek any such endorsement before
launching its operation in Lesotho in 1998. Moreover, both the SADC and ECOWAS
treaty regimes have similar criteria for intervention, and both seem to provide for a pro-
democratic right of intervention.
Lesotho
In 1998, when segments of the civilian population in Lesotho, including opposition
party supporters and rogue elements in the sitting government, supported a mutiny by
" CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND TREATIES: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, INSITrUTE FORSTRA-
TEGIC STUDIES UNIvEPSrrV OF PRETORIA (Ad hoc Pub. No. 34) 91-93 (M. Hough & A Du Plessis eds., Oct. 1997).
Id. at 95, Art. 5, Objective (c).
l" The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defence and Security,
Gaborone, Botswana, June 28, 1996, in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL, SECURITY, HUMANI-
TARIAN AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA (Ad hoc Pub. No.
33) 32-35 (M. Hough & A Du Plessis eds., Nov., 1999).
" Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Region, in AFRICAN LEGAL MATERIALS, AFR.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 197 (Mar. 1999).
142 ASIL Proceedings, 2002
junior military officers, the small landlocked country plummeted into mass chaos. The
situation quickly intensified as loyalist and opposition forces composed of divided
segments of the army, police, and the civilian population clashed violently on the streets
of Maseru, the capitol. When the situation became intolerable, and at the request of the
lawful government, South Africa and Botswana, acting under the veil of SADC, launched
a robust intervention to thwart any attempt at a coup d'etat and to restore law and
order to the country in accordance with SADC agreements, namely the Protocol. And
unlike ECOWAS entering into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, when SADC
(South Africa and Botswana) launched its operation in Lesotho, the complete legal
framework for the intervention was already in place.
THE NEW AFRICAN UNION
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (Union) came into force in March 2001.2
The Act lays out a completely new governance framework for the African continent-its
EU-like structure varies considerably from that of the OAU.
Article 4 of the Union entitled Principles of the Union, includes three very important
provisions on the regional security or peacekeeping front; Provision (h) accords the
Union the right to "intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity." Provision (J) accords member states the "right... to request intervention
from the Union in order to restore peace and security." Provision (p) "condemns and
rejects unconstitutional changes of government" (think of the OAU Sierra Leone ex-
ample). These provisions complement and "continentalize" those enumerated in the
ECOWAS Framework and Protocol and SADC Protocol.
The willingness ofAfrican states to codify criteria for military intervention and openly
condemn undemocratic seizures of power in the instrument constituting the conti-
nent's foremost political body is astounding. Even more surprising is the fact that Afri-
can nations have given the AU the authority to invoke a right of humanitarian interven-
tion-the best evidence of their commitment to achieve peace, security, and stability
on the continent.
CONCLUSION
This seemingly new African liberalism about regional security is chiseling away at the
absolutist/positivist structure of state sovereignty and nonintervention, which is giving
way to the logic responding to the harsh realities of a continent marred by deadly con-
flict. While political elites often have mixed motives for supporting particular policy
prescriptions, both democrats and autocrats alike recognize that intrastate, interstate,
and regional peace and security are precursors to an environment enabling authentic
political and economic development. Both reformers and thieves recognize that sta-
bility is necessary, whether to effect positive change or to pilfer the state's wealth;
hence, there are incentives for both democrats and autocrats to secure a conflict-free
environment. This may explain the general consensus among political elites in Africa
to endow regional bodies with the authority to use force in states under limited cir-
cumstances.
12 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, I Ijuly 2000-Lome, Togo. The Act came into force eight months later
(Mar. 2001) after receiving ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU.
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Whatever the case may be, it is unambiguously clear that African states and their
organizations have proffered the world's most advanced legal and sociopolitical frame-
works to combat conflict and regional insecurity. No other nations or regions have
offered comparable structures-nor have they demonstrated a similar willingness to
sacrifice human and tangible resources and sovereignty for peace and security. The new
African interventionism has influenced state behavior both inside and outside Africa,
and state practice and treaty law developments have added significant weight to the
development of the corpus of international law and policy, particularly on peacekeep-
ing, peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention, and pro-democratic intervention.
PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION IN ARICA
by David Wippman*
When the United States invaded Panama in 1989, the international reaction was
overwhelmingly hostile. The UN General Assembly and the Organization of American
States (OAS) voted overwhelmingly to condemn the intervention, even though it was
evident to everyone that the advent of democracy in Panama had been blocked only by
General Noriega's refusal to seat the democratically elected government of Guillermo
Endara, and even though Endara and most Panamanians welcomed the U.S. invasion.
At the time, most states firmly adhered to the view that foreign states could not legiti-
mately use armed force to seat a democratically elected government against the will of
an indigenous political elite in effective control of the state.
The world has come a long way since 1989, and, rhetorically at least, Africa has
perhaps come the furthest. The United Nations, the Organization on Cooperation and
Security in Europe (OCSE), and the OAS, among others, have adopted treaties, decla-
rations, and other instruments reaffirming democracy as the only legitimate form of
governance; the OCSE and the OAS have pledged to take action to reverse any uncon-
stitutional overthrow of a democratic government. Africa has joined the trend, and
contributed to what Thomas Franck labeled the emerging democratic entitlement
through a series of intra-African documents insisting on the promotion of democracy
in the region.
Perhaps most notable is the Organization of African Unity's Declaration on a Frame-
work for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government, adopted in
July 2000 after a meeting in Lome.' The declaration, expressing grave concern at the
phenomenon of coups d'etat, rejects the unconstitutional seizure of power as an
unacceptable violation of the OAU's basic principles. The Declaration reaffirms OAU
members' common commitment to democracy. It articulates a set of agreed principles
of democratic governance, including constitutionalism, separation of powers, an
independentjudiciary, political pluralism, respect for democratic change and space for
political opposition, free and regular elections, and respect for human rights.
More important, the Declaration specifies a progressive OAU response to unconstitu-
tional seizures of power or "the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish
power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections." At the request of any
member, the OAU Central Organ will condemn the unconstitutional action and sus-
pend the affected government's participation in the OAU. If democracy is not restored
within six months, the Central Organ is to institute "a range of limited and targeted
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
'AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000).
